Russia and the Wages of Terror
Moscow is now living with the reality of renewed terrorism. It seems nearly inevitable. This conclusion is not the result of panic — it is, rather, an assessment of the chances of our own survival. So what should be done? How can we avoid the next tragedy?
It’s now quite clear that the methods our military is using during the so-called antiterrorism operation in Chechnya have been transformed into methods for reproducing terrorism. This week, Russian forces further stepped up the crackdown.
A young generation of radical Chechen fighters, reared on these Russian methods, is now fighting far more cruelly for the liberation of their land from federal forces than Aslan Maskhadov, the aging Chechen president. And only a small fraction of those radicals was destroyed by Russian special forces in the Moscow theater; the far larger part is preparing new acts of revenge against Russia that we cannot anticipate.
At the same time, the intellectual inadequacy of our special services, especially the Federal Security Service, has become obvious. Yes, our special-forces troops shoot expertly, and there is enough poison gas in the country to wipe out everyone if necessary. However, as far as the main task — the prevention of terrorist acts — is concerned, our special forces are impotent and the bold rhetoric of President Vladimir Putin about the rebirth of the mighty security service has proved a myth.
This is clear from the fact that the very cream of the special forces who managed the operation to free the hostages in the Moscow theater did not know basic information about their enemy in Chechnya. They didn’t know the answer to basic questions like these: Who is in the Chechen political-military leadership? Who is in Mr. Maskhadov’s inner circle? And most important, what should be done next?
Mr. Putin so far has only demonstrated that we are unwilling to yield to terrorists of any sort, even if it costs the lives of innocent citizens. So how are we to make peace with Chechnya now? Can we negotiate with Mr. Maskhadov? Will he have the authority to negotiate? These questions make peace talks seem impossible, but is there any other option?
There is still another important question: who will bring together these camps? The figure of a mediator, without whom it is unlikely that anything useful would result, is of central importance. And that mediator must come from outside the Kremlin. Any mediator from the federal center would not have the trust of the Chechens and, more important, there is no one in the political establishment eager to sacrifice his or her political career for the sake of contributing to a transitional settlement in Chechnya.
Of course, none of this can happen unless the Chechens are given complete assurances that field commanders they send to the negotiations will not be arrested by the Russian government.
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Anna Politkovskaya






